Instrumental (or operant) conditioning, a form of animal learning, is similar to reinforcement learning (Watkins, 1989) in that it allows an agent to adapt its actions to gain maximally from the environment while being rewarded only for correct performance. However, animals learn much more complicated behaviors through instrumental conditioning than robots presently acquire through reinforcement learning. We describe a new computational model of the conditioning process that attempts to capture some of the aspects that are missing from simple reinforcement learning: conditioned reinforcers, shifting reinforcement contingencies, explicit action sequencing, and state space refinement. We apply our model to a task commonly used to study working memory in rats and monkeys&mdash;the delayed match-to-sample task. Animals learn this task in stages. In simulation, our model also acquires the task in stages, in a similar manner. We have used the model to train an RWI B21 robot.
Introduction
A service dog trained to assist a handicapped person with the tasks Ot l~(111V living can respond to more than 60 verbal commands to turn OIl lights, open the refrigerator door, retrieve dropped objects, and the like (Canine Companions tor Independence, 1~)~)~). Many other animats. including rodents, pigeons, and dotphins. have also been shown to be capable of teaming cOlllplicltL'd behaviora) routines. ISce 13re)and & L3rrlmld (196B) and I'rN,or ( l v75) tor striking ,lecounts of behaviors taught to a variety of species. Animais learn new behaviors quickly BB-Iicii they are trained using instrumental (or operant) conditioning techniques, which are based on principles of cognitive psvclioloi,4y.
Mobile robots trained by methods such as Q-iearning (Watkins. 1 ~»O) have not come close to matching the sophistication and versatitity of anima! learners, Though this disparity is undoubtedly due in part to the superior perceptual and motor capabilities of animals, techniques for animal training also have been studied for considerably longer, and by many more investigators, than those for robot training. We suggest that closer attention paid to the animal training literature and a serious attempt to mode) the effects described therein lllav yield benefits of immediate value to robot lear17iI7~ researchers and might provide a 17eBv, co177putatiollally oriented perspective on anima! learning.
On the basis of the pioneering work of B. F Skinner on operant conditioning (Catania & Harnad, 1988) , we have coined the term S~~inue'rho~ to describe autonomous teaming robots that employ strategies and exhibit behavioral eflects characteristic of instrumental teaming (TOlll'ttZlW' t~ Saksida, 1996) . This article describes the investigation of a parClC'lllar conditioning technique called c/;f)N;n~&horbar;in which behavioral routines are built up from smaller action segments-and how it can be applied to mobile robot learning. We developed a learning algorithm that incorporates aspects of chaining that reinforcement learning techniques do not address, such as shifting reinforcement contingencies and learning of conditioned reiiiforcers. We chose as the first test case for our learning model ,1 classic cognitive assessment task that involves behavioral sequences, the delayed match-to-sample (DMTS) task (Blough, 1959) . We also have implemented the model on an 1-~,Wl t32 mobile robot.
Operant conditioning
In operant conditioning, the acquisition and further performance of an action dcpends on the consequences experienced upon its completion. This type of teaming is called nporaJrt because the behavior operates on (has an effect on) the environment; it is IIrsII'tflll('Ilf~I~ because the behaviors is instrumental in producing reward. This type of learning affords the animal some degree of control over its environment in that it has the ability to produce changes in its situation by performing an appropriate action. For example, the animal may learn that food can be produced by pressing a lever. It follows that instrumental learning enables animals to cope with a dynamic environment in which the consequences of their actions may vary. This contrasts with classical. or Pavlovian conditioning (Pavlov, 1 O?7) , in which learning is limited to associating a possibly arbitrary conditioned stimulus with a reinforcing (unconditioned) stimulus that elicits some type of innate behavioral response. For example, food as the unconditioned stimulus naturally produces appetitive responses such as salivation; electric shocks produce fear and avoidance responses; and a noxious stimulus, such as a puff of air delivered to the eyeball, produces defensive responses. In a classical conditioning procedure, an initially neutral stimulus such as a tone or light is followed repeatedly by an unconditioned stimulus. After learning, the conditioned stimulus comes to elicit a similar bchaviornl response even in the absence of the unconditioned stimulus. Thus, when the bell rings, the dog salivates even if no food is delivered. Because the responses that occur during classical conditioning are innatc, an animal that could learn only Pavlovian contingencies would be wholly dependent OIl evolutionary processes to construct responses appropriate to the stimuli received.
The phenomena of classical and operant conditioning are not as COSIIy distinguished as the preceding description suggests: each shares some properties of the other, suggesting that both involve the same underlying mechanism. Pavlovian responses are known to occur alS part of instrumentally conditioned behaviors; for example, a rat that has learned to press a bar to get food will begin to saiivate when the bar is pressed (Holland, 1~W3) . Conversely, in a process known as mnteclrnpiyT, classical contingencies can produce the sort of volulltary behavior normally associated with instrumental conditioning rather thai purely autonomic or reflexive responses (Brown &. Jenkins, 1l )()H). In Cllt original autoshaping experiments, done with pigeons, a standard operant chamber with a lighted response key and food hopper was used. The key was illuminated for a fixed, brief period, and food was presented at the offset of each illumination. The pigeon learned to peck the key even though reinforcement was IlOC contingent Oll that action.
.-
Classical conditioning has a well-developed computational theory, the Rescorla-Wagner theory and its descendants (Rescorla & Wagner, 1 97?; Sutton & Barto, 1981; Klopf, 1988; Barto & Sutton, 199()) , that predicts the strength of a stimulus-reward association based on factors such as stimulus saliency, background stimulus rate, and training history. I11 addition, some simple models of classieal conditioning have been implemented on robots (Verschure, Wray, Sporns, Tononi, Edelman, 1995) . Classical conditioning is of some value to robots: It is useful for a robot to be able to learn predictive values of stinluli and possibly to follow them with innate anticipatory responses. However, instrumental learning, which involves associations between actions and their outcomes, allows for the modification of responses in an unstable environment; it confers an ability that probably is more critical to the robustness and practicality of a Illobile robot. At present, there are no theories of instrumental conditioning comparable in scope and exphcitness to the Rescoria-Wagner mode! of classical conditioning, much less a unitied theory of both phenomena. The goal of our work is to provide such a theory, instantiated as a computational model. This artirle describes an initial step in that direction.
Chaining
Complex behaviors can often be broken down into components and analyzed as a sequence of operant. I For example, a chicken trained to &dquo;play the piano&dquo; pecks a sequence of keys to obtain a food reinforcement at the end of the tune (Breland & Breland, 1961) . A pig taught to &dquo;grocery shop&dquo; pushes a cart and selects specific items to place in it, one after thc other (Breland & Breland, 1961) .
A bchavioral chain can be analyzed as a sequence of stimuli and responses. The core unit of a chain is called a ~(11~.'; it consists of a discriminative stimulus, a response, and a reinforcer. The chain begins with the presentation of the first discriminative stimulus. When the animal makes the appropriate response in the presence of this stimulus, a conditioned reinforcel-' is presented ns a reward for the response. The reinforcer also functions as a discriminative stilnulus for the next link i17 the chain, setting the occasion for the next desired response. This process continues for a number of links until reaching the final stimulus in the chain, which is a primary (innate) reinforcer (such as food). The links are &dquo;overlapped&dquo; in that the discriminative stimulus for the production of one response is the reinforcer tor the previous response; this holds the chain together. The concept of chaining differs from other examples of response sequences, such as fixed action patterns, in that chains of behavior can be modified through reinforcement. Fixed action patterns, as found in many animals, are hard-wired: Once the sequence is initiated, it goes to completion independent of the consequences of the behavior. An example of this type of behavior occurs in the Greylag goose. When an egg rolls out of the goose's nest, the goose 4vill stand up, put its bill on the egg, pull back toward its chin, and roll the egg into its nest. While engaged in this fixed action pattern, the goose always performs the same behaviors in the same order. It will continue the pattern even if it loses its grip on the egg, and the pattern is triggered by any round stimulus outside its nest, including beach balls.
Thus this type of behavior is much less flexible than that involved in instrumental chaining. See l3arnett (1981) for additional examples of fixed action patterns.
The idea that patterns of responding call be reduced to a succession Ot stimulusresponse units has been controversial: Skinner (1938) claimed that all behavior, including language, could be represented this way, whereas others, such as Chomsky (1959) and Lashley (1951) held that sequential behavior could not be adequately accounted for in these terms. There now is considerable evidence, however, that 1 The animal learning literature defines at least two classes of behavioral responses (Schwartz, 1989) : (1) respondents, which originate with the stimuli that elicit them (e.g., a reflex); and (2) operants, which are determined by their effects. on the environment as they do not require eliciting stimuli. 2 At least two types of reinforcers can be distinguished (Reynolds, 1968): (1) Primary reinforcers can reinforce behavior without the animal's having had any prior experience with them (e.g., food, water).
(2) Conditioned reinforcers acquire the power to reinforce behavior during the lifetime of the animal via a Pavlovian mechanism in which the stimulus that becomes the conditioned reinforcer is paired repeatedly with a primary reinforcer. many (though probably llot all) types of behavior sequences are held together in this way (Gollub, 1 c)77). The concept of constructing for mobile robots behavioral sequences from snlall elements is appealing in that the programmer's responsibility would be limited to the construction of just these behavioral primitives, plus the learning algorithm for putting them together. Many different behaviors could be assembled from a welldesigned set of primitives, and learning could potentially be made taster because knowledge could be shared among tasks with similar subtasks. (Grossberg, 1972: Schmajuk & Urry, 1 ~)O5) address only simple responses to conditioned stimuli. None of these models approaches the full richness of vertebrate learning, involving, tor example, acquisition of secondary reltiforcers and construction of behavior chains.
Graham, Alloway. and Krames (1994) describe a &dquo;virtual rat&dquo; designed to let undergraduates try their hand at operant conditioning. Their program is hard-wired to acquire a particular conditioned reinforcer (the sound of a food dispenser) and to respond to a specific shaping strategy to teach the simulated rat to press a bar for tood _ (Krames, Graham & Alloway, 1995) . Other primitive actions, such as grooming, can be encouraged by linking them to food rewards, but the progralll is not flexible enough to permit shaping anything complex except for bar pressing, nor is it possible to teach the rat to respond to external signals such as a tone or light. Also there are no provisions yet tor chaining behaviors, for modifying the qualities of a particular motor response, or for refining the simulated animal perceptual abilities.
Maki and Abunawass (199 1) model learning of a match-to-sample task (no delay) using a backpropagation network, In animals, this task requires learning a complex sequence of actions (see section j). Maki et al.'s network, however, takes a sample stimulus and two potential match stimuli as input and learns to compute two exclusive or functions for its output. It produces no overt behavior, just a &dquo;matrh left&dquo; or &dquo;match right&dquo; signal. Thus, the model does not emulate operant conditioning, but it does offer some suggestions about the learned internal representations of stimuli that might result from such conditioning.
Reinforcement learning bears some similarity to operant conditioning: Reinforcement learners do not need to be shown correct responses as training stimuli, as is required by supervised learners such as backpropagation. Like operant conditioning, reinforcement learning is appealing because it theoretically allows an agent to adapt its actions autonomously to get the most from its environment as it gains information over time. In addition, reinforcement learning does capture some aspects of animal behavior, such as adaptive foraging in bees (Montague, Dayan, Person & Sejnowski, 1995) . Furthermore, a neural representation of the kind of reward sig-rlal required for reinforcement learning has been found in both bees [the VUMmx 1 neuron (Hammer, 1993) ] and primates idopaiiiine neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta and vcntral tegmental area (Schultz, Romo, Ljungberg, Mirenowicz, Hollerman & Dickinson, 1995) ). Nonetheless, as we argue in the next section, operant conditioning in mammals is a richer phenomenon than can be addressed by current reinforcement learning theories. Some work has been done on reinforcement learning of sequential tasks. Singh (1992) describes a sequential task learner in which separate &dquo;Q-modules&dquo; learn different elemental and composite tasks, and Mahadevan and Connell (1992) use Q-learning to acquire multiple behaviors that can then be controlled by a hardwired switching scheme to designate which should be active at a given time. Asada, Uchibe, Noda, Tawaratsumida, and Hosoda (1994) constructed a robot soccer player that learned to push a ball into a goal while avoiding an opponent. They examine techniques for combining ball shooting and collision avoidance behaviors, each acquired separately using Q-learning, into a policy function that accomplishes both tasks. Although these articles look at sequential task learning, their approaches have been demonstrated only in simple environments, as they are subject to the usual combinatorial limitations of Q-learning.
Composing behaviors from primitives, a more general problem than chaining, has also been investigated for mobile robots. Mataric (1995) showed how foraging behavior could be constructed from routines for wandering, homing, aggregation, and dispersion, plus some innate reflexes such as grasping an object whenever one is encountered. In later work, she used reinforcement learning to implement a complex behavior by deriving a policy for selecting the appropriate primitive behavior based on the robot's current state (Matari~, 1996) .
Other examples of reinforcement-based robot learning include those of Dorigo and Columbetti (1994) , Colombetti, Dorigo & Borghi (1996), and Mllliii (1996) . However, these authors rely on immediate reinforcement strategies in which the robot's action at every time step is positively or negatively reinforced by an automated traincr. (A human trainer would be unable to keep up.) This does not make for a realistic model of animal learning.
issues Critical to the Success of Instrumental Conditioning
A model of instrumental conditioning
A close examination of the steps involved in the chaining of animal behavior reveals several issues that are critical to thc success of the procedure and that have tlot been considercd in previous computational models of conditioning.
2.1.1 Conditioned reinforcers (bridging stimuli) Contiguity of action and outcome are critical to instrumental learning: An action must be closely followed by a reinforcer in order for the animal to learn an association between the two. In a training situation, however, it is often difficult to reward an animal with food immediately after the occurrence of the desired response. Conditioned reinforcers are stimuli that become associated with food or water (or some other innate rewardeven exercise) and serve as a signal that &dquo;the reward is coming; ~ thereby eliminating the gap between the desired action and the reinforcement signal. For example, in a Skinner box, every time the animal is about to receive a food pellet, it will hear the click of the food dispenser operating. The sound quickly becomes a conditioned reinforcer; the animal learns the click means food will be available soon. The close tcrllporal contiguity of the action and the sound of imminent reward is sufficient to produce a much increased likelihood of performing that action again.
Another important consideration is that the sound of the dispenser can be heard throughout the Skinner box. This makes it possible to reward the animal when it is not at the food hopper.
In typical reinforccment learning techniques, credit assignment is a major problem. After completing a sequence of actions that lead the agent to the goal, the agent, in order to learn which of those actions should be credited with contributing to the final success, must evaluate the goodness of each action that was performed. When the only reward obtained occurs at the end of the sequence, only knowledge of the cumulative effect of the actions can be derived. Our model deals with this issue by learlling conditioned reinforcers of the sort described earlier. It discovers primitive subgoals, such as hearing the sound of the dispenser activating, and seeks ways to achieve them.
2.1.2 Shifting reinforcement contingencies In operant conditioning, there is often a nonstationary reward function. When constructing a complex behavioral chain, a new reward contingency is introduced each time a new phase of training is begun.
A more dramatic example of response to a change in reward is the phenomenon known as L'1'f111ClI0ll. When reinforcement of a behaviors is discontinued, the animal eventually will stop producing that behavior, but in the short term its activity level actually rises ill response to discontinued reinforcement and, furthermore, the variability of its responses increases. In this way, the animal broadens its exploration of the action space and may discover a variant of the learned action that will once again produce the expected reBvard. Animal trainers exploit this phenomenon to shape complex behaviors. See Millan ( 1 ~)~)-~) for a related idea&horbar;increasing the variability of actions of a robot learocr as a response to failure to improve performance. reinforcement teaming algorithms such as Q-!earning (Watkins, 1989) can track nonstationary environments but do not explicitly detect changes in reinforcement contingencies and respond to them as animals do. Our lnodel detects the changes in reinforcement contingencies and uses this information to trigger changes in its representation of the environment. For example, in the early stages of learning the DMTS task (described (ater), a switch press produces a water reward. When 177ore of the task has been acquired, a switch press can have two outcomes: Either the water pump runs or a light comes on, depending on context. The initial predictor for the Wattr pump, which used to be quite successful now suddenly is wrong liilf the time. Our model responds by resetting the reward tables tor the &dquo;hear pump&dquo; goal and the success counts of its predictors,. This causes the lllodel temporarily to become more plastic, readily entertaining new predictors that exhibit greater accuracy, and willingly dropping old ones-but not until they can be replaced by better versions.
2.1.3 Action sequencing One difficulty with sequential task decomposition is that a mechanism must be in place for directing the construction of the behavior chain: It is highly unlikcly that all agent will bc able to achieve a complicated goal state simply by composing action sequences randomly, Our mode) uses all explicit tempera) predicate representation that allows it to distinguish the order in which events occur, in order to learn behavioral sequences. The primitive subgoals mentioned previously also function as discriminative stimuli and thus set the occasion for an action to take place.
2.1.4 Perceptual (state space) refinement A further problem with reinforcement learning techniques is that they usually are restricted to a very small state space to avoid combinatorial explosion. As in other approaches based oil explicit symbolic representations (including much of classic artiticial intelligence), we accommodate a large state space by factoring it into a set of predicates. We then can construct logical expressions to refer to collections of states in economical ways. Another advantage of this approach is that it permits incremental refinement of the state space by adding new predicates. For example, under either classical or operant conditioning, an animal will learn to distinguish tones at two different frequencies if they are associated with different rates of reward. Thus, a predicate such as HEAR ( tone ) Table 1 State of working memory at the moment water u received might eventually be supplanted by HEAR (high-tone) and HEAR ( low-tone) . We have not included shaping of stimulus discriminatiols in our current learning algorithm but intend to address it in the future.
2.1.5 Action refinement Combinatoriat considerations also linlit the number of actions aV<111aL71t 111 most reinforcement teaming simulations. However, animals arl'. capable of an inhnite variety of actions. They can be taught to produce all arbitrary gesture by a shaping process in which, ilitially, an innate bchavior close to the desired gesture is rewarded to increase its repetition rate; then the criterion for reward is altered smoothly to shift the ,min1.l1's performance io the desired direction. For exampte, <1 dog is shaped to turn i11 a circle by initially rewarding it for any slight movement to the left, then raising the requirements u11ti1 eventuaity a ti111 360-degree turn is achieved. We will ilot address shaping ill this article, but we will note that when actions are represented as paralllcterized templates, <i simple version of shaping can be had by hill climbing. The reward signal then not only increases the likelihood that the action will be repeated, but it also shifts the description of the action itself,.
Memory representation
To introduce our model, we consider the <;imple case of a rat pushing down on a bar to get water. The working memory module (WM) holds a rollcetion of time-labeled predicates describing the rat's current perceptions and actions and those of the recent past. At the 111SCallt when the rat receives a water reward, having previously heard the pump run, the contents of working memory might appear as 111 Table 1. In this notation, time () is the present, time I is the previous instant, time ? is the instant before that, and so on, The algorithm for inferring reinforcement contingencies operates on a collection of slightly Illore abstract items called ~rnyvrnl prcdic¡l!cs. These are derived from working memory elements by replacing ilumeriral time tags with the sylllbolir labels shown in Table 2 . For conciseness, the : now tag will usually be left implicit in the Table 2 T.1~~ used to construct tel11por.11 prL'lhcates rest of this article. The : fut tag is used to refer to predicates that became true at I I + 1 during retrospective analysis of the results of action at time t.
Working memory elements persist for only a small number of time steps. depending on the predicate invotved. [n the present simulation. AT and GOTO predicates last for two time steps, SEE and HEAR for six. and PRESS for eight. This is because the animal is always at some location and nearly always moving. so location-rotated items acculllulate quickly. Conditioned stimuli and specialized actions (such as bar pressing) occur less frequently and so are more memorable.
In the next level of representation in the program, we form conjunctions of predicates. Temporal tagging of these items allows us to infer cause-and-et3cet relationships between actions and stimuli and to construct temporal sequences. For example, the crucial match relationship in the DMTS task is described by the conjunction PRESS ( switchl ) : past & PRESS (s'.vi tchl) : now. plus ,1 similar conjunction for the second switch.
Learning reinforcement contingencies
The conjunctions our program constructs describe sequences of stimuli and actions that can occur in the world. Some of these occur frequently: others might never be encountered. Furthermore, some sequences often are followed by a reinforcement signal, whereas others never are. To extract this information from its experience of the world, the program maintains two tables for each reinforcer. One counts the number of times each conjunction has been satisfied since that reinforcer was acquired; the other table counts the number of times a conjunction's occurrence has been followed on the next time step by the reinforcer. The 1'('1r'c1r'l~ ratr of a conjunction is the second quantity divided by the first. The program attempts to hnd conjunctions with maximum reward rates, A conjunction that predicts rewards with no false alarms would have a reward rate of 1.~ ).
In complex domains, we cannot afford to test all possible conjunctions of predicates, so heuristic search is used. Conjunctions are constructed lTlrrrllltl7tally by combining a pool of currently &dquo;best&dquo; conjunctions (starting with the null conjunc-tiol) with ,1 pool of &dquo;best&dquo; predicates. A &dquo;best&dquo; conjunction is olc whose reward ratc is at least one standard deviation abovc the mean rate or whose reward count is at least one standard deviation above the mcan counts. Both tests are necessary. Items with high reward Willits constitute important features of the ~Ilv1ro17171t17C that need to be incorporated into conjunctions even if their reward rates in isolation arc low. For example, because going to the water dispenser does not make the pump run, GOTO (dispenser) has a tow reward rate but, because water is available nowhere rlsr, it has a high reward count, items with high reward ratrs are accurate predictors and should he retained tor further exploration, even if their reward counts ,irc rela-Lively low (leaning they each account for only a limited number of the reBvards that have been rereivcd). Drescher (1991) makes a similar observation in his Piagetian learning n)od~l, wherein he distinguishes between rolwallmu ald rc/h~'~f)' measures.
During teaming, conjunctions that are stiflicleiitlB, well correlated with rewards generate &dquo;pr«iirtors&dquo; (i.e., rules for predicting rcward). These may displace earlier predictors that have not performed as well. To allow for the effects of noise, predictors are Il()t I-l'L,11C'lCl ulltil they have ,1 reasonably high application count (so their success rate can be nerur,ltrlv estimated) and their repl.1cemcnt has a signiticll1t1y higher success rate.
During imna) l I I (iearmng to go to a food or water dispenser when the mechanism is heard to activate), a typica) sequence ot teamed predictors and their reward rates is shown here.
Predictor 3 says that of thc time. when the simulated rat heard the pump and immediately went to the water dl,,pcilsei-, it recclB,cd o water reward. Therefore. this conjunction predicts water with perfect accuracy.
To generate behavior, we look tor predictors that can be satisfied by the rats taking some action currently available to it. Predictor ) suggests going to the water dispenser, so initiaHy the rat spends a lot of time there. This causes the reward rate of GOTO (dispenser) to drop, because on most occasions there will be no water available. (Nonetheless, the reward coult tor the predictor remains high relative to all other predicates, as the dispenser still is the only place where water can 11L' obtained.) Hecause predictor I gives many false expectations of reward, it soon is dropped. Predictor 2 is somewhat more successful, but it cannot be satisfied by the rats own actions, because at this point it) training the rat has no way to cause the pump sound to occur. However, predictor 3, which most accurately describes the current reward contingencies in this environment, cnrr be used by the rat to generate behavior whenever the pump is heard to run. Predictors in our model can be divided into two classes: those that contain an action term and those that do not. Because the former can be satisfied by executing the action, they are instrumental rules. The lattcr, such as predictor 2, may br viewed as 1'avlovian rules: They represent an association between stimuli. The response generated by this association would have to be innate and hard-wired.
Acquiring conditioned reinforcers
The second type of learning il our mode) is the acquisition of new conditioned reinforcers. If the skinnerbot Could find a way to make HEAR (pump) be true, then prcdictor 3 suggests it could get water whenever it wanted. Hence, HEAR (pump) becomes a secondary reiiiforcei-, and thc skinnerbot begins trying out theories of what causes the pump to run. At approximately this point in the training process, the trainer stops triggering the pump randomly for magazine training and rewards only bar presses. I3y exploration, the skinnerbot eventually discovers that pressing the bar will make the pump run and that nothing else will. Thus, the following predictor is acquired:
Now suppose the skinnerbot is at the water dispenser along the north ,,>,ill of the Skinner box, and the bar is in the northeast corner. The preceding predictor cannot apply because the PRESS (bar) operator is not aB,,allable at the dispenser. This impasse generates a new secondary rrintorrer, CAN ( PRESS ( bar ) ) , which the skinnerbot also seeks to control, leading it to discover another prcdictor:
The : fut tag indicates that if the skinnerbot is at the northeast corner at time t + 1, it will be able to press the switch at t -~-1. It Cal1 make the predicate true by a GOTO action or, if it is already at the bar, it need only refrain from going elsewhere.
Now the skinnerbot has a hierarchy of reinforcers. The primary (innate) reinforcer is water. The most important secondary reinforcer is the pump sound. A more remote secondary reinforrer is the ability to press the bar.
Action selection
At each time step, the skinnerbot seeks a predictor that it ran satisfy. Predictors are prioritized by the nature of the reinforcement they promise, so that given a choice, the skinnerbot always will act to secure a more basic reward (water) over a more abstract: one (the ability to press the bar). It it tilds <l predictor tor which at) but one of the predicates is currently true (i,c&dquo; matches an item in working memory), and the fast ol7r can be made true by taking some action that is presently available, then it will selcct that action with high probability. There is also some randomness in the action selection mechanism, to tacilitate exploration. CAN goals must be handled specially. Thcy are looked at only when the program has some other subgoa) that Could be satisfied if the CAN ~oal's action were availablc. For example, if thc prcdirtor tor water had as antecedent the conjunction SEE (light) & PRESS ( bar ) , the skinnerbot only needs to be able to press the bar if it sees the light; the rest of the ti111r it does not matter whether the skinnerbot can press the bar, as the predictor cannot be satisfied without the light. When SEE ( 1 ight ) is true, the prcdictor can be satisfied if PRESS (bar) is an available action. Hence. CAN ( PRESS (bar) ) becomes a goal worth satisfying at tllt point. and this, in turn. allows the predictor for the CAN goal to ture the skinnerbot to the location of the bar.
With the previously discussed L,1-rdietorv tor thc bar-pressing task and the ordering imposed by the reinforcer priori tie&dquo;, the skinnerbot will shuttle back and forth between the northeast corner and the center of the north wall, alternately pressing the bar and collecting its water reward.
Fi~urc I shows the overall flow of intormation in the lc<iriiiiig pro~ran7.
Predictor creation and deletion
We use .1 variety of heuristics to constrain the search through the space of possihle predictors. New predictors tor a given rciiiiorccr are created only when that reintorccr has just been received and the reward counts updated. At th<lt point, the program can check candidate predictors against its working memory, so that it constructs only those predictors that would have prcdicted the reward it just acquired. Furthermore, in order for new predictors to be created, the reward must either have been unexpected, meaning the current set of predictors is incomplete, or there must have been at least one false prediction since the last reward was encountered, meaning there is an erroneous predictor, one that is not specific enough to express the reward contingencies accurateiy. New predictors are created from the best-scoring conjunctions currently maintained tor that reinforcer. If several conjunctions are tied tor top score, the ones with the fewest number of terms are selected. If there still are several candidates, two are chosen at random to become new predictors. If these turn out not to be the best choices, further experience will increase the scores of the conjunctions not chosen, because their instance and reward counts are still being updated in working memory at every time step. In addition, occasional selection of random actions may give ' r rise to unexpected rewards that cause new conjunctions to be created. As the best performing conjunctions see their scores increase, they become predictors on some subsequent trial and eventually replace the predictors they outperform.
Two numerical measures are used to assign scores to conjunctions and predictors: rrmrit and clornrrit. They estimate the lower and upper bounds, respec tively, on the true reward rate, based on the number of examples seen so far. Let r1 be the number of times a conjunction has been observed to be true, and r the number of times the reinforcer was received on the subsequent time step. Merit and demerit are defined as follows:
.
Figure 2
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For n = 0. the merit is defined to be 11 and the demerit I. The difference between the merit and demerit values can be taken as all uncertainty measure for our estimate of reward rate (GaHistet, 1~0~1), chap. 13) (see Fig. 2 ). As ii approaches 00, merit and demerit both converge to r/</. the true reward rate. The constants in the equations tor merit and demerit were chosen empirically to give an appropriate balance between reward estimates ,./1/ and confidence values vvhen ii is small. For example, a conjunction that has been true six times and followed by reward four times has an estimated reward rate of 0.667 and a merit of 0.536. A conjunction that has been true only twice and followed by reward each time has an estimated reward rate of 1.() but a merit of only 0.4)3, due to low confidence. The constants in the merit equation were chosen so that >il(4, <» > A/(2,2) > ill(2, ,1), When creating new predictors, candidate conjunctions are sorted by merit rather than raw reward rate to give greater weight to conjunctions that have been sam-plecl more hcavily. When deleting predictors, demerit is used. so the program is conservative in its judgments and does not delete too quickly.
Predictors are deletcd in three circumstances. First, if the predictor has just given a false alarm, it may be deleted lt its demerit is below a certain minimum value. This is necessary so that poor predictors do not trap the program il1 unsuccesstu) behaviors, thereby hindering the program discovery of better options. Second, if a reinforccr has just been predicted correctly, the prcdictor may be deleted if its demerit is less than thc highest merit of any other successful prcdictor for that rcinforcer. In other words, when the program is contidcnt that a better-performing prcdictor exists, the poorer one is displaced. Both predictors must have predicted the reinforcer just received. Finally, a predictor will be deleted if there is another predictor whose antecedent uses a strict subset of thc terms in this predictor's conjunction, whose merit is nearly as good, and whose number of trials is sut1-icicntly high that there is reasonable confidence that the two predictors are equivalent. This helps the program find minimal predictors for the domain, replacing those with extraneous terms. However, once an adequate set of predictors has been learned so that therc are I7o unexpected occurrences of o reinforcer and iio filse alarm, the current version of the program stops creating new predictors tor that reilltorccr, so a strictly minimal set of predictors is not always attained.
3 The DMTS task
The DMTS task is widely used in cognitive lleurosciencc to measure properties of working memory. The basic idea is to present the subject with a stimulus (the sample), impose a delay, and then present a pair of stimuli, one of which matches the sample. The subject must select the matching stimulus in order to receive a reward. The delay period can be varied to control the length of time the sample must be maintained in working memory. There are both spatial and llollspatial versions of this task. In the spatial version, all stimuli are identical they are distinguished on the basis of the location at which they appear (Hampson, Heyser & Deadwyler, 1993) . In the nonspatia! version, the sample appears ill one location and the two probe stimuli appear in othcr locations, it is the visual characteristics of thc stimuli that matter (l3ussey, Muir & RObblI7s, 1994) . There is some debate as to whether the spatial version of the task actually involves working memory; animals might be using some other type of mediating strategy, such as aligning thcir body toward the site of the last stimulus, to bridge the delay (Gutl1ikov, l3arnes & Rawhns, 1 994) . Our learning algorithm can be applied to either the spatial or nonspatia! version of the task.
Hampson et al.
( 1 ~~3) describe a spatial version of DMTS for rats that uses as stimuli two retractable switches mounted on the wall of a Skinner box, as shown in Figure 3 . A water dispenser is located between the two switches, and a light and noarpoke port are mounted on the opposite %vill. (A nosepok~ port is a hole with ,1Il infrarcd tight-emitting diode and sensor positioned so that every time the rat pokes its nosc ioto the hole, it breaks the bealn, allowing the event to be detected.) At the start of a trial, 1 of the switches extends, and the rat must go over and press that switch. This causes the switch to retract, white at the same time a li~ht goes orl over the rlosepoke port. The rat must now go to the opposite wall and make repeated nosapokcs for a variable delay period averaging ! minute. (The nosepoke requirement is intended to prevent the rat from parking itself in tront of the switch it just pressed until the switches extend again. That sort of mediating strategy would eliminate the need tor working memory.) At the conclusion of the delay period, the next rlosepokr causcs the li~ht to go out and both switches to extend. Now the rat lust return to the switch it pressed previously and press it again. It it chooses the correct switch, it receives a water reward.
l~.ats are taught this task in stages. Hampson et nl. (1<)<)3) report a training time of 2 to 3 months.
Shifting reinforcement contingencies in the DMTS task
Both rats and our mode) require multiple training stages to learn the 1 )MATS task. In our simulation, there are four stages. In the first stage, the pump is triggered at random times and the task is to leafll that Bvater is available at the dispenser whenever the pump sound is heard.
In the second stage, one or the other switch is presented at the start of a trial. The switch immediately retracts when pressed, and the pulp runs. This leads to the following predictor for switch 1 (a similar rule is learned tor switch ?):
Because the switches can be pressed only when they are in their extended position, and hence visible, the following predictor also is learned:
Notice that the predictor uses GOTO ( swl-loc ) rather than AT (swi-loc) : fut. If the rat is at some other location, either predicate would sutficc to bring it to the switch. The reason GOTO is preferred is that once the rat goes to the switch, it will press thc switch at tiiiic r, and at time I + the switch will be retracted. The predictor that used AT would have its antecedent satisfied at ald thus generate a false expectation that CAN ( PRESS ( swi tchl ) ) would still be true at I + 1. The preferred predictor avoids this error because it will not be satisfied if the action at time is PRESS rather than GOTO. Note that if the rat is already at the switch but executes a GOTO (swl-loc) anyway, the action has no effect, but in this case the antecedent is satisfied and we have a true prediction that the switch will bc prc;;able at / + 1.
In the third training stage, a trial begins with a light going on over the nosepoke port. The rat learns that poking thc port when the light is on causes the switches to extend:
There is a similar rule for switch 2.
In thc fourth and final stage, a single switch appears at the start of thc trial, and pressing it causes the sight to go ol. Before this stage, switch pressing always ran the pump. Now it cal produce either the pump or n right, depending ol context. The previously learned predictors tor HEAR ( pump ) and SEE ( 1 ight ) are no longer 100% accurate. The program observes the changed contingencies and responds by resetting the reward tables that govern its behavior for those reiiifoi-cers, which has the etiect of making the lodel more plastic-eager to acquire new predictors and more willing to replarc old ones. Predictors that earlier did an adequate job of characterizing the environmclt's reinforcement contingencies then are replaccel with more selective versions:
The NOT ( reinf orced ) predicate is true at time t if the Illodel has not received any reinforcers recently (no rrcorcj in working memory). It is a way of marking the start of a trial. Because seeing a switch is itself reinforcing, when it comes time to nosepoke, the mode) already has begun the new trial, so the prcdictor above actually checks tor NOT ( reinf orced ) : pas t. Iy the time the switch reappears near the end of the trial, this item will have faded from working memory. As a marker tor the second half of the trial, the model uses SEE ( light ) : past. In the second half, a switch press produces the pump sound rather than the light.
Superstitious behavior
because the model a)ways is trying to tOrIllUlMtl exp)anations for rcinforrers, it will construct thcm even when no wplalation is possible. For example, at the start of training, the pump is triggered ot random times. The model will generate prruirtors tor HEAR (pump) and act on whichever ones have the highest apparent reward rate. Thus, it on several occasions it happened to be moving ti-olll the southeast corner to the northeast corncr when the pump ran, it might decide that this action was <ililv(Ifl,~ the pump to run and might begin repeating it deliberately. IfwatL'r is actuary being dispensed randomly, but at sufficieiitly frecluant intervats, the predictor will be SUe('tWtLll often enough to be retained and perhaps even strengthened. This sort of &dquo;superstitious&dquo; behavior has been observed in rcal animals (Skinner, 19~~i) , although the underlying mechanisms remain unclear (Staddon ~r Sill1melhag, Il)7 1).
I11 the second training stage, the pump sound is reliably predicted by switch pressing, so the mode) replaces thc superstitious predictors with accurate ones. It then begins forming superstitious predictors for the appearance of a switch that occurs at the start of each trial.
Results

DMTS simulation
A minimum of ten predictors are required for the DMTS task, as shown in Figure 4 . Our program leiriis a set of predictors equivalent to this optimal set, but with some extraneous terms and redundant predictors remaining. For example, in our fbrmulation of the DMTS, there are tBvo equivalent predictors tor receiving water when the pump runs, which are teamed at 1lL',lrly the same time:
Some examples Of correct predictors that thc program learned with harmless extra At some points during the learning process, an animal may develop a bias in favor c~f one of tile two switches, so that it almost never presses the other switch.
Our program sometimes docs this as well. If an animal develops a bias, the trainer introduces a few so-called correction trials in which the allilllal is forced to choose the correct switch. We use the same approach. Our training mechanism alternates between the two switches as samples (correct responses) and keeps track of how many times each was recently chosen in the match phase of trial. It the ratio between the two switches exceeds 2 : 1, a correction trial is given in which only the correct switch is presented in the match phase, so the program is forced to pay attention to that switch. This )eads it to propose new predictors invoiving the switch, which compete with the earlier ones until an omrall correct set of predictors is found.
In a typical run. the program experienced 171) trials: 10 for stage I , 20 for stage 2.
20 tor stage ,I, ,1Ild 20 tor stage -t. It created a total of 300 predictors, near)y 200 of which were for the SEE ( swi tchl ) ,1I1d SEE ( swi tch2 ) goats, because when these occur at the start ot a trial, they are not pi-edictible from preceding stimuli. (A, long os its predictions for a goal are less than perfect, the program keeps trying new predictors.) The progr,Ul1 's performance on trial 17() is shown in Figure 5 . and the acfua) predictors that produced this behavior are shown in Figure 0 . At time steps 2():-) I and 29:-)1, the program is shuttling between the nosepoke port and the location of switch l, waitity for a new trial to begin. The shutthng is caused by a recently created superstitious predictor. 2(J.), that soon wall he deleted. At time step m)~ i. switch 1 appears, and at step 2():-)-t. the program presses it. ~Note that it did not use predictor 44 to get to switch 2. instead it happened to use predictor 148, which predicts SEE (light) rattier than CAN ( PRESS ( switch2 ) ).[ This predictor is . successful predictor because other predictors, such as I 117, will cause switch 2 to be pressed once the program has arrived ot that location. At time step 1():-)S, the sight turns on in response to the switch press and. at 2():-)(¡, the program nosepokes. This causes both switches to extend ,it 2~87. and predictor 2) ) generates a CAN goa) that predictor 44 satisfies by taking the program to switch 2. At 1()¡';¡';, the program presses the matching switch, causing the pump to run at 2():-)(). The triat concludes at 2()q() > with the receipt of the water reward. Figure 7 , is an 1-~Wl 1321 mobile robot with a color camera ot~ a p,1I1-tilt head ami a three-degrees-of-treedom arm with a gripper. Computing power is provided by three on-board Pentiul11 processors. A I -Mbps radio modem links AI11e1i,] to a network of Spare stations that contribute additiona) processing cyctes. For our experiments, we ran the teaming program in AHegro Common Lisp on a Spare 5 aod used task centre) architecture (TCA) (Siml11ons, 1 ')')-~) to communicate with the robot.
Robot implementation Amelia, shown in
To provide reinforcement stimuli to the robot, we added a Logitech three-button radio trarkboll. The human trainer can stand anywhere in the vicinity of the robot and press a button to semi a reward si~t~al when a desired response occurs. The button press is picked up by ao on-board receiver plugged into a serial port on om of the Pentiums and relayed to the learning program on the Spare. The robot acknowledges button presses with a brief audio response.
As a preliminary experiment in robot training, Ameha was taught to sort objects into bins based on color. We used pink and green plastie dog toys as the manipulalia Figure 6 The aitual predators respoosibte tor the 1)rogr.iiii's betiavior oo trial 171), shnBB)) m the order 111 winch they ire ,1pplied. and two blue recycling bins ,is receptacles. In thr first training stage we provided ,i single recycling bin to the left: of the plattorm where dog toys were preselted to thc robot. We presented Amelia with pink toys one at a time and rewarded the robot for dropping them io the bin. ln the second stage, we placed the recycling bin to the right of the platform and provided green toys, again rewarding Amelia for dropping them in the bin. At this point, Amelia had learned that dropping objects in bins produced rewards but had not learned to make discriminations based on color or loratiol. ln the third stage, we placed bils on either side of the ueltral platform aod alternatcly presented pink and green toys, rewarding the robot only for dropping a pink toy in the lctt bin or a green toy in the right bin. Correct behavior was obtained quickly by constructing these predictors: Training a robot in real time raises a number of issucs lot addressed il computer simulation, such as the proper delivery of reward signals, Because the current teaming program works il discrete time steps, it is important that an action performed at tile
Figu~e 7
Al1Iell,! pertlm11lI1g the toy-sorting t,i;k. The hunun trainer issues rewards nsnig the rmiu~ tr,¡ckb,dl in I~cr lrtt h.md. I be rewarded at I + 1. not at I or I + 2. Our solution is to have the clock &dquo;tick&dquo; at the instant an action is begun. If the robot decides at time 1 to tower its gripper and drop a pink toy in the bin to its left, then DROP-AT (loci) becomes the action for time t and the clock is advanced to I + I. Thus, as soon as the trainer sees the robot moving to drop the toy, he or she can press the reward button, and the reward will be recorded as occurring at + 1. If thr trainer waits too long, however, the action will be completed and, as it takes essentially 110 time for the robot to decide OI1 its next action, the clock may move O11 to t + 2 before the reward arrives. In future work, we expect to switch to a continuous-time model to avoid this sort of brittieness.
Discussion
We have described a model of operant conditioning that successfully learns a task requiring a complex behavioral chain: the DMTS task. Our work highlights several aspects of operant conditioning not addressed in most earlier models:
1. reinforcement contingencies change over time. Thc incorporation of this into our model allows a trainer to add new elements to the ,1Ilimal's (or robot's) behavior without losing previously teamed information. 2. Conditioned rcintorcers hold the behavioral chain together. These learned reinforcers. such as the sound of a pump or the appearance of <i light, help the animal deal with the credit assignment problem when learning a complex task. 3. Discriminative stimuli &dquo;set the occasion&dquo; tor performing a particular behavior. In other words, they signal to thc animal that execution of all action now will produce a reward. Our mode) represents these stimuli as terms in a conjunction. In chained behaviors, discriminative stimuli help the anima) keep track of the order of actions. An eB<1117p1e is the light in the DMTS task, whose presence indicates it is time to nosepoke. Discriminative stimuli may change over time. Animal trainers use a technique called ~~n</t~ ~'&dquo;.f, wherein the signal to perform an action gradually is made more subtle or perhaps is replaced attogether with a less saiient stimulus. We do not yet model stimulus fading. 4. Animais have lar~;e, continuous state and action spaces. II1 our model, we tactor the state space into conjunctions of predicates that refer to collections of states in all economica) W,l)'. In this way, we avoid the limitations of table-driven reinforcement teaming algorithms, which require a small state space to avoid conlbillatorial evplosion. Many other artificial intelligence programs use this salllc approach. What is novel here is the development of heuristics based on reward rate and total reward to guide the construction of new conjunctions and predictors based on the program's recent experience.
Much work remains to be done to complete a computational-level iiiodel of operant conditioning. To expand our model of chaining to incorporate more results from the animal learning literature, one idea that we would like to explore is operator shaping. We would like to ccluip our robot with an initial set of innate behaviors (operators) that may l7ot leeessarily be ahlr to satisfy fully the requirements of the trainer or the environment, What would thcl7 be needed is a means for refining operators with experience, similar to the anima) training technique called .</<<~N~. Evidence for the existence of innate behavioral elements (l3errid~c, Fentrcss & I'arr, 11),')'7), combined Bvith the success of shaping in animal learning paradigms, suggests that this would be a very powel-tul mechanism for improving the performance of our learning algorithm.
We also need to add tacilities for refining perceptual predicates with experience, so that the 177odc1 can acquire finer-grain discriminations if the reinforcement con-tIIl~tI7C:1~1 require this. Animals can learn to make very fine distinctions in pitch. intensity, and color, but they also can generalize on these properties, depending on the demands of the task. This makes the state space dynamically refilable with experience.
We have coined the term skirmcrlmt to rcter to a class of agents designed tor operant t conditioning but, unlike Skinner, we do not eschew representations in our theory. Once we have laid more of the computational-level groundwork tor our model, we will be able to move on to a model that addresses some of the preseltly unsettled psychological issues in instrumental learning (Dickinson, 1995) .
Watkins, C. J. C. H. (1989) nlaill research interest involms building computational-level models of animal IO,II'11111~ phenomena and then implementing the models o17 mobile robots. The goals of these pursuits are to investigate the processes underlyling anima) learning and to use this knowledge to build better robot controllcrs.
